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Abstract
Even though European labor markets are characterized by high average un-
employment,there is a shortage of high-skilled labor,leading many European
economists to argue for an immigration policy directed at actively recruiting
highlyqualifiedworkersfromabroad.Ithasfurtherbeenarguedthatanimmi-
gration policy that is tailored to attract young and economically successful mi-
grants can alleviate some of the demographic burden associated with an aging
population. We embed this discussion into a systematic classification of eco-
nomic migration research according to its major conceptual and applied ques-
tions. The state of theoretical and empirical research on the migration deci-
sion,the literature on the economic performance of immigrants and their eco-
nomic impact is reviewed briefly,proceeding along the lines of a clear concep-
tualframework.Inaddition,thepaperdiscussesexpectationsonfuturemigra-
tion flows and the policy options of immigration countries for dealing with
these flows.
JEL-Classification:F22,J61
Keywords:Immigration,European labor markets,Immigration policy
* Thomas K. Bauer, RWI Essen, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, CEPR, London, and IZA, Bonn;
John P. Haisken-DeNew, RWI Essen, DIW, Berlin, and IZA, Bonn; Christoph M. Schmidt, RWI
Essen, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, CEPR, London, and IZA, Bonn. All correspondence to Tho-
mas K. Bauer, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI Essen), Hohen-
zollernstraße 1–3, 45128 Essen, Germany, Fax: +49-201-8149-284, Email: bauer@rwi-essen.de.–
The authors ares grateful to Alphonse L. MacDonald and two anonymous referees for helpful
comments on an earlier draft of the paper.1. Europe as an Immigration Region
The second half of the last century has seen major shifts in the nature and the
extent of worldwide migration.While the classical immigration countries such
as the United States (US) have remained major receiving areas,their sources
of immigration have changed substantially, away from the traditional Euro-
pean origin countries to Latin America or Asia.At the same time,many soci-
eties in Europe have been transformed by their intense and multi-faceted im-
migration experience in the fifty years after World War II.Finally,at the turn
of the century the projected enlargement of the European Union (EU) in
combination with increasing migration activity worldwide has placed migra-
tionhighontheEuropeanagenda.Thisdoesnotonlypertaintocurrentmem-
bers of the EU. Central European countries face increasing problems with
their new role as transit countries for people heading towards Western
Europe. Also the characteristics of these migration flows have become more
diverse.Temporarymigrationofworkers,especiallyhigh-skilledworkers,con-
tinuously gains in relevance, while traditional migration networks appear to
lose in importance. Moreover, increasingly restrictive migration policies to-
wards asylum seekers,refugees,and unskilled workers have increased the im-
portance of irregular migration and human trafficking.
Despite the existing resistance of many receiving countries towards further
immigration, worldwide migration flows have increased since the 1980s and
the early 1990s (SOPEMI 1999). In the last decade, the number of sovereign
states directly involved in international migration has been rising steadily.Ac-
cording to the IOM (2003),the total number of international migrants in 2000




2002 provide recent surveys of current migration trends in Europe),followed
by Asia with a migrant stock of almost 50 million, and North America with
about 41 million migrants.
For example, between 1988 and 1997 the share of the foreign population in-
creased from 4.5 percent to 9.1 percent in Austria,from 7.3 percent to 9.0 per-
cent in Germany, and from 5 percent to 6 percent in Sweden (OECD 1999).
Measured in per-capita terms,however,the Oceania-Pacific region with a mi-
grant stock of 19% of the total population appears to be the most important
receiving region, followed by North America with an immigration share of
13%. Six out of the 10 countries with the highest net immigration from
1970–1995 are either from Europe or North America.1
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1 TheotherfourcountriesincludeSaudiArabia,India,Australia,andtheUnitedArabEmirates.The overarching theme of the current migration debate is the nature of the
economic effects for the receiving economies. Yet, neither are the causes and
consequencesofmigrationwellunderstood,norisitobvioushowtopredictits
development into the future. Most importantly, immigration has become a
more variegated phenomenon, making a shift of research particularly to the
receiving region Europe indispensable. Within Europe the free movement-
agreementoftheEU,inprinciple,smoothesthewayforlabormigrationacross
national borders. Yet, despite the demise of socialism in Eastern Europe
mobility within the EU still seems rather low or even negligible,thereby mov-
ing migration from outside Europe into the center of the discussion.
The current situation of the European labor markets is characterized by
rather high average unemployment. However, there is typically a shortage of
high-skilled labor as well. Thus, European economists argue increasingly for
an immigration policy directed at actively recruiting highly qualified workers
from abroad. Among migration experts there is even a growing perception
that the industrialized countries have been involved for a long time in a con-
stant competition for high-skilled workers (for a recent overview on high-
skilledmigrationseeRothgang,Schmidt2003).Inaddition,Europe’ssocieties
are aging,placing their pay-as-you-go social security systems under consider-
able demographic pressure. It becomes increasingly well understood that a
regulationoffutureimmigrationthatistailoredtoattractyoungandeconomi-
cally successful migrants can alleviate some of the demographic burden asso-
ciated with an aging population (Bonin et al.2003).
We embed this discussion into a systematic classification of economic migra-
tion research according to its major conceptual and applied questions. The
state of theoretical and empirical research in this literature is reviewed briefly,
proceeding along the lines of a clear conceptual framework.Although there is
no unique, all-encompassing theoretical model covering the complete spec-
trum of topics, economic reasoning concerning migration issues can be con-
ceptualized into three broad lines of research. The first research area is con-
cerned with factors determining the decision to migrate, and consequently
with the magnitude and the composition of migration flows. The analysis of
this theme is an important prerequisite for the understanding both of migrant
performance and the impact of immigration,which are the other two areas of
economic migration research.
Researchontheeconomicperformanceofimmigrantsinthedestinationcoun-
try asks how migrants’ wages and employment outcomes or their dependence
on the welfare system compares to those of comparable natives,and how this
comparison changes as the migrants’ duration of residence unfolds.A closely
related aspect concerns the perception of and the attitudes towards immi-
grants by the native population in the receiving country. A third line of re-
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lation and the macroeconomic performance of the destination country. Per-
haps most importantly, it is asked whether immigration reduces the wages or
employment prospects of natives or already resident migrants of preceding
entry cohorts,and under which mechanisms.A mirror image of these research
questions is provided by concerns over the possible brain drain emigration
from sending countries.
These three areas are interrelated with one another and exhibit a close con-
nection to immigration policy.Migrants’ skills are arguably the central theme
of all economic migration research.Since immigration policy might influence
the composition of immigration flows and since formal and informal human
capital endowments mainly determine the economic performance of immi-
grants in as well as their impact on the destination country,immigration policy
plays a decisive role for the consequences of immigration.
Throughout the paper,we will concentrate our discussion on what we will call
henceforththeregion(i.e.allcountriesofEurope,includingTurkeyandIsrael,
CanadaandtheUnitedStates(US),andallcountriesoftheformerSovietUn-
ion including the Central Asian Republic).In section 2,we provide a general
typology of migration and migrants as well as a critical discussion of the reli-
abilityofexistingstatisticalinformationoninternationalmigration.Migration
flows in the region before and after 1990 together with the policy responses of
the countries under consideration towards immigration are described in sec-
tion 3. Particular attention is paid to the background of an aging society and
thedemandforhigh-skilledworkers.Section4offersasurveyoftheeconomic
literature with regard to the performance of immigrants in the economy and
their integration into the society of the receiving countries,and provides a dis-
cussion of the economic impact of migration. Finally, section 5 discusses our
expectations on future migration flows and the policy options of immigration
countries for dealing with these flows.
2. Typology of migration and statistical information
Migration is usually defined as the movement of a person or group of persons
from one geographical unit to another across an administrative or political
border,wishing to settle permanently or temporarily in a place other than the
place of origin.Since the movement between two geographical units does not
havetooccurdirectly,onefurtherdifferentiatesbetweentheplaceoforiginor
sendingregion,transitregions,andtheplaceofdestinationorreceivingregion
(IOM 2003: 8). Movements within a country are usually defined as internal
migrationand,accordingly,movementsacrossinternationalbordersarecalled
international migration. Henceforth, we exclusively focus on international
6 Thomas K. Bauer, John P. Haisken-DeNew and Christoph M. Schmidtmigration.This section introduces the conceptual aspects of the study,and ad-
dresses the important issue of data availability.
Concepts:Migration and migrants
The broad concept of migration comprises many different forms of migration
flows and distinct types of migrants.To organize our ideas about this phenom-
enon,we briefly develop a typology of migrants based on three key character-
istics. In contrast to many alternative attempts at the classification of migra-
tion flows, different combinations of these three characteristics comprehen-
sively describe the various modes of migration. Figure 1 visualizes this
typology of migrants along a triangle whose sides represent three main ques-
tions for the characterization of migrants:(a) Who is making the decision;(b)
What is the motive for the migration decision; and (c) What is the regulatory
environment?
Ingeneral,(a)themigrationdecisioncouldbemadebyindividuals,families,or
by an extended family network.Different to individual migrants,the decision
of family migrants is only partly driven by their own social and economic con-
siderations (Mincer 1978).Rather,it is the opportunities and restrictions of all
familymemberswhichmattertothedecision.Thusitmightnotbesufficientto
useindividualinformationtounderstandmigrationdecisions.Itmightevenbe
the extended family which is making the migration decision.A member of the
network might be sent away to work in a location which is characterized by
different economic shocks to insure the extended family against adverse
shocks at home (Stark 1991).
In terms of (b) the migration motive one can differentiate three types of mi-
grants: those seeking out economic opportunity in the destination economy,
migrants who aim to invest into increased economic opportunities at home
upon their return by either accumulating savings or human capital, and mi-
grants who move because of political, ethnic or religious oppression in their
homecountry.Inmostcases,themaindrivingforcebehindthemigrationdeci-
sion of individuals is the desire to improve their material living conditions.
Usually it is assumed that these migrants plan their move and invest in infor-
mation and those aspects of human capital that are necessary for a successful
integration in the labor market and society of the receiving country (Chiswick
1978).
A related motive for working abroad is the accumulation of savings or skills
with the objective of returning to the origin and building a better future there.
This link between economic considerations and migration activity might not
be obvious in the data.By contrast to these two motives,ethnic migrants,asy-
lum seekers, and refugees rather migrate because they are either discrimi-
nated against in their country of origin because of their ethnicity,race or gen-
der, or are forced to move because of armed conflicts in their home country.
International Labor Migration, Economic Growth and Labor Markets 7Even though this is coerced migration, empirical evidence suggests that their
choice of the receiving country is determined at least partly by economic con-
siderations as well (Rotte,Vogler 1998).
Regarding (c) the regulatory environment, one can differentiate between le-
gal permanent migrants who wish to settle in the place of destination indefi-
nitely, legal temporary migrants who aim to stay in the receiving region only
for a limited period before returning back to the place of origin or moving on
to another destination area, and illegal migrants. The legal status has direct
consequences for the living situation of a migrant in the receiving area.Illegal
migrantsareoftennoteligibleforsocialandmedicalassistanceandwillhavea
difficult time securing certain civil rights. They may also be subject to deten-
tion,expulsion,deportation,andprosecution.Inaddition,illegalmigration,es-
pecially of women and children,is increasingly associated with trafficking and
smuggling of human beings (see IOM 2003 for a more detailed discussion and
some estimates on the size of this type of migration).
The above typology of migrants naturally comprises the most important
groups of migrants observed. The migration decision of guest-workers and
so-calledtargetsavers,forexample,usuallyisanindividualdecisiontomigrate
temporarily on a legal basis to another country for economic reasons.For asy-
lum seekers,the decision to migrate is most often made by families because of
some form of oppression in their home country and – upon the approval of
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Typology of Migrants
Who is making the decision? What is the motive for the decision?
What is the regulatory environment?
Individuals
Families Investment for economic
opportunity
Economic opportunity abroad







Figure 1their asylum status – they stay permanently in the receiving country on a legal
basis.Despite its high conceptual appeal,a typology based on three character-
isticscannotbecompletelyexhaustive.Thesamepersoncouldchangeclassifi-
cations depending on the place of origin and/or destination and with time of
residence in the receiving country.Motivations are not clear cut,either.Even
thoughthemigrationdecisionofasylumseekersandrefugeesisduetothepo-
litical and social situation in their place of origin,the choice of the destination
area may be determined by economic reasons or family networks.
Hence, according to the migration motive it may be unclear from the view-
point of the receiving area whether to classify an asylum seeker or refugee as
humanitarian or economic migrant. Furthermore, the experience of many
guestworker countries in Western Europe has shown that migrants who origi-
nally intended or were supposed to stay only temporarily often change into
permanentmigrants.Migrantswhoenteredacountrybyoverstayingtheirvisa
or by immigrating without valid or with forged documents often have the op-
portunity to obtain legal residence status in the receiving region,for example
by regularization programmes.In addition,changes in residence or work per-
mission laws in the destination regions often result in changes of the legal sta-
tus of the migrants already residing in these countries. Because of different
regulations across countries concerning residence and work permissions the
same migrant could hold a different legal status in different destination re-
gions.
Paucity of reliable statistical information on migration and its characteristics
Unfortunately, the main source of statistical analyses in migration research
has been aggregate data,either in form of time series or as regional cross-sec-
tions.Timeseriesaremoreprevalent.Thiscouldbeexplainedbytheavailabil-
ity of data provided by the statistical offices in the respective countries or by
internationalorganizationssuchastheOECD.Inaddition,inprincipletheec-
onometrictoolsforanalyzingaggregatetimeseriesdataaresufficientlydevel-
oped to allow a sound analysis. The quality of such studies, however, is im-
paired by the low quality of the data. Even in single countries the material is
oftenflawedbymeasurementproblems.Forinstance,itisoftendifficulttoob-
tain reliable numbers for out-migration even in countries with a tight registra-
tion system: emigrants are often not compliant when it comes to deregistra-
tion.
Because international migration statistics are produced at the national level,
cross-country studies almost exclusively suffer from low data comparability.
There are substantial differences across countries in the measurement of mi-
grationflows,whichcouldbelargelyexplainedbydifferentinstitutions,differ-
ent definitions of migration and migrants,and a persistent lack of cooperation
between the responsible national statistical institutions (see IOM 2003,Chap-
International Labor Migration, Economic Growth and Labor Markets 9ter16,foraverydetaileddiscussionoftheseproblems).Onemajorproblem is
thatmanyEuropeancountriesonlycollectinformationonpersonsthatdonot
hold the citizenship of the country of residence.Researchers are often forced
to use this information as a proxy for the number of migrants in a particular
country, because separate statistics on foreign-born people are not available.
These studies do not properly capture naturalizations, second generation im-
migrants,and ethnic migrants.2
Furthermore, migration studies using time series data often suffer from the
problem that they are unable to discriminate between migrants moving for
purposes of seeking out economic opportunity,and coerced migrants.Econo-
metric studies on the determinants of international migration often need to
maintain,explicitly or implicitly,severe identification assumptions in order to
beabletoassesstheimpactofexplanatorydemographicandeconomicfactors
onthemagnitudeofmigrationflows(Fertig,Schmidt2001)ortheysufferfrom
measurement error resulting from the low quality of the underlying data
(Bauer,Zimmermann 1998).
Since the last decade,researchers in economics have increasingly analyzed in-
dividual-leveldata.Becauseoftheavailabilityofthenecessarydata,thistrend
hasbeenmuchstrongerintheUSthaninEurope.Theinvestigationofindivid-
ual-level data was hampered in the past by limited computer facilities and the
lack of econometric techniques to deal with the often discrete or only partly
continuous nature of the data,if such data was available at all.Due to the tre-
mendous speed in the improvement of the main frame and micro computer
technologies the situation has changed dramatically since the 1980s,making it
possible to handle large data sets on PCs or workstations.Currently the provi-
sion of such data remains more and more the real problem,at least in Europe,
becausethistypeofdataisoftenmadenotavailabletoresearcherswiththear-
gument that this would endanger the privacy of respondents.3
To summarize, long-run consistent and reliable time-series of stock and flow
data of migrants across countries are not available yet, although there is a
long-standing recognition of the importance of better international migration
statistics. Reliable statistics on irregular migration and the social and eco-
nomic situation of undocumented migrants are (partly by nature) non-exis-
tent. To a large extent, illegal migration is measured using border apprehen-
sion data, which is widely recognized to be unreliable and for cross-country
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2 For instance, Germany has received millions of ethnic German migrants in the last decades,
whichareallnotcoveredintheofficialstockstatisticofmigrants.Asaresultoftheratherrestricti-
ve German naturalization laws, many second generation immigrants are still counted as foreig-
ners, even though they have been born in Germany. There are similar problems in many other
European countries.
3 Adetaileddiscussionofthemethodologicalproblemsarisingthroughtheuseofindividualdata
is provided by Bauer,Zimmermann (1998).comparisons because of differences in national definitions. In addition, indi-
vidual-level data could be made available to researchers by invoking modern
approaches to data security and confidentiality.Further efforts to improve in-
ternational migration statistics (for example along the lines of the United Na-
tions Recommendations on International Migrations Statistics) and better ac-




– impact”, the economic analysis of the migration decision and the corre-
sponding migration flows has the longest intellectual history (e.g.Ravenstein
1889). The standard neoclassical model of the migration decision perceives
migrationasanindividualinvestmentundercertainty.Withinthiscost-benefit
framework the individual compares the present value of the expected present
and future costs and returns to migration (Sjaastad 1962). The returns com-
prise monetary returns,mainly induced by a change in labor earnings,as well
as non-monetary returns associated with amenities such as an attractive cli-
mate and environment. The costs of migration consist of monetary cost like
travel expenses and search costs for finding an occupation in the host country,
as well as non-monetary costs of migration,such as foregone earnings and the
psychic costs arising from the loss of the familiar environment and the con-
frontation with another culture.Migration would be worthwhile in case these
costs are exceeded by the returns to migration.
Aggregate migration flows then comprise all candidate individuals who dis-
play such a positive net return. While this traditional reasoning provides the
intellectualbasisforvirtuallyallaggregate-levelempiricalstudies,theiractual
performance has been disappointing throughout. Typically, these empirical
analyses regress a measure of aggregate migration intensity on a kitchen-sink
set of aggregate explanatory factors comprising wage or income information,
and perhaps employment rates (Fertig,Schmidt 2001).Unfortunately,no sta-
ble patterns emerge from these studies whatsoever, mainly as a reflection of
data limitations. Therefore, the precise economic determinants of aggregate
migrationflowsarestilldiscussed.Sincethereareseveralrecentsurveysofthe
literature on the determinants of migration (see, among others, Molho 1986;
Bauer,Zimmermann1998,2002),thissectionwillconcentrateonadescription
of the migration flows and important developments of migration policies in
the region.
Migration in historical perspective
In the nineteenth and twentieth century,international labor mobility played a
central role for many countries in the development of their societies,in inter-
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nineteenth century,migration experienced a temporary high,as the overall at-
titude towards immigration used to be quite liberal.Similarly,in the 1960s and
early 1970s many receiving countries in the region actively recruited labor
from other countries to deal with their perceived lack of unskilled labor.
Starting with the first oil-price shock,the attitudes of most receiving countries
changed towards the limitation of immigration, resulting in a “zero-immigra-
tion”policy in many European countries.
Inmostcases,thischangeinattitudesreflectedage-oldanxietiesthatimmigra-
tionofunskilledindividualsexertsdetrimentaleconomiceffectsonnativesby
increasing income inequality and unemployment. In addition to these eco-
nomic arguments, opponents of immigration fear that it may increase social
tensions and endanger national identities. Because of these arguments, and
high and persistent unemployment, public pressure to tighten immigration
possibilities has been very strong during the last couple of years,especially in
Europe. Even though there is little public support for further immigration,
many European countries more recently initiated modest attempts to admit
more high-skilled migrants, reflecting a worldwide increasing demand for
skilled labor.
The increasing mobility of individuals throughout the world could be traced
back to a variety of factors.These include the collapse of the socialist regimes
in Eastern Europe, rising income differentials between rich and poor coun-
tries,and armed conflicts and human rights violations.Falling communication
and transportation costs increased the information about economic condi-
tions in potential receiving areas and reduced problems in financing the costs
of migration.The worldwide globalization process also resulted in a change of
themigrationexperienceofmanycountries.Bycontrasttoearlierdecades,not
only the traditional immigration countries, Australia, Canada, New Zealand
and the US but also most other countries in the region are affected by increas-
ing migration flows.
For the traditional immigration countries,immigration was an essential ingre-
dient in the early development of the society.There are significant differences
inthemigrationpoliciesadoptedbythesecountries.TheUSrelytoalargeex-
tent on family migration,while other traditional immigration countries follow
a mixed strategy by managing immigration through quotas for different types
of immigrants and a selective policy towards labor migrants by the means of a
point system. Nevertheless, these countries share a common characteristic in
that they still encourage immigration for permanent settlement on a signifi-
cantscale.Europeancountrieswitheitherpost-colonialimmigration,predom-
inantly the United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands, or active recruit-
ment of temporary workers, for example Austria, Germany, and Sweden, de-
fine the second important type of immigration countries in the region.
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Spain and Ireland,recently became immigration countries.Apart from return
migration, these countries do not have a long experience with the inflow of
foreign workers and are just developing immigration policies. In the case of
the Southern European countries, the increased inflow consists mainly of ir-
regular migrants. Together with some countries in Central and Eastern
Europe (CEE),such as for example the Russian Federation,the Caucasus,the
CzechRepublic,andPoland,theyfurtheractasimportanttransitcountriesfor
irregular migrants heading towards the North-West. Estimates suggest that
hundreds of thousands of irregular migrants from Africa,Eastern Europe,the
Middle East, Central Asia and China try to enter the EU via these transit
countries (IOM 2003).
Provoked by the fall of the iron curtain, some countries in Eastern Europe
have become important emigration countries.Many ethnic migrants returned
from their East European home country to West European countries.For ex-
ample, 300,000 Bulgarians of Turkish origin have returned to Turkey since
1989.Finland faced immigration of ethnic Fins from the Balkans and the for-
mer USSR (IOM 2003).The most important receiving country for ethnic mi-
grants is Germany.Between 1989 and 2001,more than 2.5 million ethnic Ger-
mans from the former USSR, Romania, and Poland arrived in Germany
(Bauer et al. 2003). In addition, some CEE countries became a major source
for temporary labor in the EU. Again, Germany acts as the main receiving
country for this type of workers. Especially Polish and Czech workers mi-
grated as contract workers or seasonal workers over the eastern borders of
Germany (Bauer et al.2003).
The political changes after the fall of the iron curtain further initiated large
scale migration flows within the CEE countries, with migration occurring
mainly between neighboring countries (Romanians to Hungary, Czechs to
Slovakia,UkrainianstoPolandorBulgaria).Finally,thewarintheformerYu-
goslavia resulted in a huge number of refugees in the EU.
Flows of labor migrants in the region
Apart from migration for humanitarian reasons, such as political asylum or
family reunification, the countries of Europe and North America have been
perceiving migration recently as an answer to medium-term labor supply
shortagesandanoverallagingofthepopulation.Indeed,manycountrieshave
recently focused on expanding immigration to fulfill labor market require-
ments of specific industries or labor market segments, such as Germany with
its intensely debated “Green Card” program. Here we examine the various
motives for and recent experiences with migration in Europe and North
America.
International Labor Migration, Economic Growth and Labor Markets 13Table 1 illustrates the cumulative net immigration flows for selected Western
European countries before and after 1990. It is apparent from this table that
overall immigration into these countries has increased in the 1990s. Apart
from Iceland,all countries in Europe experienced a positive net inflow of mi-
grants between 1990 and 2000. Traditional emigration countries, such as Fin-
land,Ireland,Italy,Portugal and Spain became important receiving countries
in the 1990s.Italy,for example,entirely reversed its experience as a country of
emigration,with approximately 900,000 people emigrating to other countries
between 1960 and 1990, to a receiving country, compensating its population
lossduetoemigrationwithinasingledecade(between1990and2000Italyex-
perienced net immigration of 1.2 million people). A similar development
could be observed for Ireland. Whereas this country experienced a net out-
flow of almost 300,000 people between 1960 and 1990, it faced net-immigra-
tion of nearly 100,000 individuals between 1990 and 2000.
With the exception of France,all countries in Europe show an acceleration of
their immigration rates in the 1990s in comparison to the previous three de-
cades. In Denmark, net immigration increased from an average of 3,000 indi-
vidualsperyearintheperiodfrom1960to1990toanaverageofalmost10,000
in the 1990s. In the United Kingdom, the average annual net immigration in-
14 Thomas K. Bauer, John P. Haisken-DeNew and Christoph M. Schmidt




















United Kingdom 114 827
Source:IOM 2003:240.
Table 1creasedbymorethan21times.Finally,inGermany,themostimportantreceiv-
ing country in Europe,the average annual immigration increased from about
160,000 in the period from 1960–1990 to slightly more than 360,000 in the
1990s.
Table 2 reports the inflows of permanent residents of the traditional immigra-
tioncountriesAustralia,CanadaandtheUSoverthe1990s4.Comparingthese
levels to that of a large European immigration country such as Germany
(3.6millionpeople),oneseestherelativelysmallabsorptionofmigrantsinthe
United States (9 million individuals) in terms of population size.The last two
columns of Table 2 show the composition of total immigrant admissions for
the year 2000, broken down by migrants immigrating through family reunifi-
cationprogramsandemployment-basedimmigrants.Theexcludedcategoryis
the group of all other immigrants (humanitarian entries, refugees, pri-
vately-assisted and government-assisted migrants and asylum seekers).
Table 2 clearly indicates the main difference in the immigration policy be-
tween the US on the one hand, and Canada and Australia on the other.
Whereas the latter predominantly rely on the immigration of workers which
are selected through the respective point system,US policy focuses to a large
extentonthereunificationoffamilies.Note,however,thatthenumbersforthe
US do not include illegal migrants,which also immigrate predominantly in or-
der to work in the US.Hence,considering also illegal migrants,the above pic-
ture might change somewhat.
Obtaining similar data for European countries is very difficult. Table 3 dis-
plays the inflows of migrants for selected European countries from 1997 to
2000 and – where available – by composition or reason for inflow. In France,
family related immigration dominates immigration for employment reasons
by a factor of 3 to 1.The numbers for Germany indicate that immigration for
employment reasons dominate, too. Note, however, that the number of work
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Inflows of Permanent Residents
1991–2000
Country 1991–1995 1995–2000
Composition of Admissions 2000
Family Employment
share in %
Australia 462,600 438,600 32 42
Canada 1,176,200 1,033,300 27 59
United States 5,230,400 3,865,200 71 13
Source:OECD 2003:299,301,310;last two columns:IOM 2003:156.
Table 2
4 These figures do not include temporary migrants, as this information was not available for all
countries over this time period.permitsissuedforthefirsttimemaybeamisleadingindicatorforthestructure
ofimmigration,sincesomegroupssuchasfamilymigrantsneedtohavearesi-
dence permit for some time before being eligible to obtain a working permit.5
NoteworthyinthecaseofGermanyisthesubstantialinflowofethnicmigrants
from the former USSR, dwarfing the volume of immigration experienced by
France.
For Italy information on inflows is not available. The stock of residence per-
mits issued in Italy for employment reasons more than doubles those issued
for family reasons. In contrast to these countries, the numbers of immigrants
accepted in the United Kingdom for settlement based on family reasons out-
weigh those accepted for employment considerations dramatically.
Due to the political changes starting in 1989,the accompanied ethnic conflicts
andanuneveneconomicdevelopment,migrationinthecountriesofCEEand
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) changed dramatically in the
1990s. Even though migration in this region took place also in the pre-1990s
(e.g.Zaionchkovskaya1996),thesemigrationflowswerelargelycontrolledby
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Composition of Inflows of Migrants
1997–2000
Flows/Stocks in 1 000 1997 1998 1999 2000
France
Total Inflow 80.9 116.9 86.3 95.2
For Family Reasons 31.1 38.3 38.0 38.5
For Employment 11.0 10.3 10.9 11.3
Germany
Total Inflow 615.3 605.5 673.9 648.8
New Work Permits 451.0 402.6 433.7 473.0
Ethnic Germans 134.4 103.1 104.9 95.6
Italy
New Work Permits 166.5 182.0 219.0 145.3
Residence Permit:
Stock,for Employment 782.3 588.7 747.6 850.7
Stock,for Family 243.4 251.9 308.2 354.9
Stock,total 1240.7 1250.2 1252.0 1388.2
United Kingdom
Total Inflow,non EU 172.7 212.6 266.2 314.0
Acceptance for Settlement:
Own Right 7.6 10.3 31.7 39.9
Family 46.2 53.0 65.2 84.9
Source:OECD 2003:174,180,201,223,273.
Table 3
5 See Bauer et al. (2004) for a detailed description of the current German regulations for immi-
gration.the respective states and consisted to a large extent of military personnel and
ethnic migration both within the region as well as towards West European
countries.The latter consisted mainly of ethnic Germans from Poland,Ruma-
nia,and the former Soviet Union to Germany,and Russian Jews migrating ei-
ther to Israel or the US.
Inthe1990s,theCISandcountriesofCEEwitnessedmajorpopulationmove-
ments (IOM 2002a).Especially in the early 1990s,the CIS region experienced
increased interstate migration flows towards Belarus, Ukraine and Russia.
Most migration to Russia in the 1990’s was ethnic and political, linked to the
collapse of the Soviet Empire, de-colonization and the emergence of inde-
pendent states in Central Asia.The main sources of these flows could be seen
in the migration of Russians from the previous republics of the USSR to Rus-
sia (in particular from the states of Central Asia,especially from Kazakhstan),
a large number of displaced persons and refugees in the Caucasus and Russia,
and an increased interstate temporary migration flow of workers (Subhan
1998; Zaionchkovskaya 1996, 2000). Mainly due to stricter border controls,
these migration flows have generally dropped since.Current migration trends
indicate that Russia remains the most important receiving region of migrants
in the CIS,followed by the Ukraine,Kazakhstan,and Belarus.Repatriates are
the most important group of migrants in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus.
Kazakhstandoesnotonlyfacelargeemigrationrates(especiallytowardsRus-
sia)butalsoaccommodatesthelargestnumberofmigrantsfromCentralAsia.
Due to inter-ethnic conflicts and a poor economic development, the three
countriesoftheSouthCaucasus(Armenia,Azerbaijan,andGeorgia)stillface
large emigration rates,both towards other former republics of the Soviet Un-
ionaswellasWesternEuropeandNorthAmerica.Inaddition,thesecountries
becamemajortransitcountriesforasylumseekersandrefugeesfromAfghan-
istan, Chechnya, and Iraq (IOM 2003). Rather surprisingly, emigration to-
wards countries outside the CIS is rather low. It reached its peak in the early
1990s and has entered a decreasing trend since.Together with asylum seekers
from the Caucasus countries,and asylum seekers and refugees as well as eco-
nomicmigrantsfromtheMiddleEastandAsia,thesemigrantsusethisareaas
a transit region on their way to Western Europe or North America.Important
shares of the emigrants are ethnic migrants heading predominantly to Ger-
manyandIsrael.Finally,amajorproblemofthisregionisthegrowingtraffick-
ing of human beings towards Western European countries, especially of
womenwhoareoftenforcedintoprostitution(see,forexample,thereportsby
Galiana 2000;IOM 2002b).
Many CEE countries experienced major changes with regard to migration in
the last few years.In the early 1990s,most of these countries have been major
source countries for migrants moving to West Europe and North America.
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of ethnic migrants from Poland and Romania to Germany, ethnic Fins from
theBalticStatesandformerUSSRtoFinland,andethnicTurksfromBulgaria
to Turkey.In addition,the political changes in the early 1990s created substan-
tial migration flows between neighboring countries such as between Romania
and Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, and between Ukrainian and
PolandandBulgaria.Furthermore,largenumbersflowsoftemporaryworkers
moved from the CEE countries to Western Europe,especially from Poland to
Germany (Bauer,Zimmermann 1999).Finally,the civil war in the former Yu-
goslavia resulted in large flows of asylum seekers and refugees heading to-
wards the EU as well as involved movements among the former Yugoslav re-
publics.Someofthosewhowereaccommodatedastemporarilyprotectedper-
sons in some Western European countries were later repatriated.
With the start of the negotiations with respect to the potential EU-member-
ship of ten CEE countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hun-
gary,Latvia,Lithuania,Poland,Romania,Slovakia,and Slovenia) and the as-
sociated adaptation of EU “acquis” in the fields of asylum and immigration,
some of these countries transformed into transit and immigration countries.
CEE countries which displayed a relatively fast economic development,such
as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia
nowexperiencepositivenetmigrationrates,whereascountriesthatstayedbe-
hind in their economic development,such as Bulgaria and Romania,have re-
mained emigration countries (Subhan 1998). The immigrants comprise both
economic migrants and asylum seekers and refugees from the CIS countries,
the Middle East, and Asia, as well as migrants who use these countries as a
transit region. Some of them become stranded in these countries. Their num-
ber tends to increase because of increasing difficulties of reaching their final
destination region erected by tighter admission regulations.
Similar to the CIS region, the CEE countries face increasing problems of ir-
regular migration and trafficking of human beings.This is partly due to exter-
nal factors, especially Western European migration policies. The Schengen
rules for the enforcement of external borders to curb illegal migration,for ex-
ample, inadvertently promote trafficking. Similarly, the development of asy-
lum systems in the CEE countries together with the “safe third country rule”
adopted in the EU-member countries shifted part of the asylum flow directed
at Western European countries back to the associated CEE countries.6
Another trend in worldwide migration is the increasing importance of high-
skilled migration. Due to the lack of data on migration by skill groups and to
the changing nature of migration (permanent vs. temporary migration), the
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6 A more detailed discussion of issues related to the “acquis” of EU-rules on asylum and immi-
gration will be given below.movement of individuals across borders, skilled as well as unskilled, is not a
well-documented phenomenon,The seminal paper on recent high-skilled mi-
gration is Carrington/Detragiache (1998). Based on US census and OECD
data on stocks of foreign-born for 1990 they demonstrate that high-skilled mi-
gration dominates recent international migration flows, and that high-skilled
emigration is a considerably more important issue for small origin countries.
Rothgang/Schmidt (2003) augment the data used by Carrington/Detragiache
(1998)withadditionalvariablesfocusingonhigh-skilledmigrationrates.They
tend to confirm the results of Carrington/Detragiache (1998) by concluding
that smaller countries but not necessarily the low income economies tend to
become deprived more and more of some of their best talents.
Moreover,thereareactiverecruitmentpoliciesforhigh-skilledworkersinop-
eration in major advanced economies such as the US, the UK, and Germany.
These policies will be described in more detail below. In addition, across the
major advanced economies, there seems to be an increasing tendency to at-
tract and, later on, retain students from less developed countries. Rothgang/
Schmidt (2003) further show for several industrialized countries that foreign
employment in the university sector and IT has caught up and often even out-
runs health care which has been the traditional sector of high-skilled migra-
tion. The importance of foreigners for high-skilled employment in these sec-
tors differs substantially between the countries included in their study, with
variations from 2.2 percent of foreign high-skilled professionals in the health
care sector in France up to 19.5 percent for foreign university and college
teachers in the US.In the UK,the share of high-skilled workers is particularly
high in the health and the university sector.These numbers are smaller in the
bigger European countries Germany and France.In absolute numbers,the IT
sector represents by far the most important of these sectors.
Regional demand for labor based on demographic processes
In many countries of the region, persistently low fertility rates, an increasing
life-expectancy and the associated aging of the population give rise to fears
aboutpressuresonpublicbudgets,andtheviabilityofpay-as-you-gosocialin-
surancesystems.Existingpopulationprojectionsindeedsuggestthatcountries
such as Germany, Italy, Spain, and Poland will experience a substantial de-
crease in their working age populations in the next 50 years.Germany,for ex-
ample, is expected to have an 11% smaller working age population by 2025,
decreasingbyafurther28%by2050.Evenmorenoticeableisthedecreaseex-
pected to be experienced by Italy and Spain: 15% by 2025 and 42% by 2050.
Such a dramatic decline of the working age population may have severe
macro-economic consequences if the future work force is unable to meet the
quantitative and qualitative need for workers to sustain satisfactory economic
expansion.The associated growing number of retirees depending on benefits
International Labor Migration, Economic Growth and Labor Markets 19and pensions may further put the social security systems in these countries at
risk.
It should be noted, however, that not all Europeans countries face the same
gloomy prospects.Countries such as the UK,France and the Netherlands are
expected to experience only a moderate decline of their working age popula-
tion,if any.The aging process is also less severe in the traditional immigration
countries in North America and Australia,partly because of the active role of
immigration for the development of these countries and the explicit policy
goal to increase the population through immigration. Only a few countries,
such as Albania and Ireland,which are characterized by relatively high fertil-
ityrates,areexpectedtoexperienceanincreaseintheworkingagepopulation
(IOM 2003),though.
Table 4 emphasizes the dilemma faced by many countries such as Italy and
Spain. Should these countries’ participation rates remain low (typically
women in most of these countries have remained largely out of the labor mar-
ket) and the active population financing the social security system continues
to shrink, a crisis of their system of social security seems unavoidable. One
possible remedy would be the implementation of structural changes of the
currentsocialandpensionsysteminthesecountries.Otherproposedsolutions
are to actively increase female participation rates by improving access to
day-carefacilitiesandthecompatibilityoffamilyandwork,andtoincreaseef-
fective retirement ages. This could be achieved by discouraging early retire-
ment and even increasing the mandatory retirement age.
Increased immigration is often considered to be another potential solution to
theagingproblem(seebelow).However,theeffectivenessofsuchamigration
policy may be limited for several reasons.The OECD (2003:106–107) argues,
forexample,thatmigrantsfromnearbyeconomiesmaynotfinditattractiveto
migrate to a receiving country. Thus, future migrants will predominantly be
people from quite different cultures. The migration of Turkish “Guest
Workers”to Germany in the 1960’s is an illustrative historical precedent.
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Table 4It may also be postulated that foreigners integrate more successfully in coun-
tries that are naturally expanding demographically.IOM (2003:245) cautions
that even while there might be an appropriate match to a labor market va-
cancy in the short run,it remains unclear,whether these new migrants will be
able to adapt to changing economic and social situations. The relatively high
unemployment rates of foreigners in Germany may act as a good example for
this objection. Still many of them are part of the guestworker system of the
1960s and early 1990s which aimed at recruiting unskilled workers from
Southern European countries. Yet, after the initial phase of recruitment de-
mand for unskilled labor was continuously reduced by technological progress.
Typically native workers had a better chance to switch to more promising sec-
tors of employment,while the guestworkers remained in declining sectors.
Even abstracting from problems of immigration, it is not clear by how much
the age composition of the influx can be influenced effectively. After all, as
long as family reunification is not precluded, even a migrant fulfilling all de-
mographic requirements (as in the Canadian point system, where age ac-
counts for 10% of all awarded points and language 24%;Immigration Canada
2003) may eventually apply to bring his parents or grand-parents,thus negat-
ing or at least reducing the intended demographic impact.
Finally, estimates of the fiscal contribution of immigrants suggest that in-
creased immigration can contribute to a solution to the aging problem, but is
by itself no sufficient remedy for it. Bonin et al. (2000) and Bonin (2001), for
example, use the generational accounting method developed by Auerbach et
al. (1991, 1992) to analyze the effects of immigration on the long-term
sustainability of public sector finances in Germany. Their results suggest that
because of the immigrants’ favorable age composition the fiscal gain from ad-
mitting labor migration is potentially large. Moreover, the descendants of
these immigrants share in the additional tax burden required to meet the
intertemporal public budget constraint.
This positive fiscal contribution of immigrants could potentially be increased
throughaselectivemigrationpolicythatscreenspotentialimmigrantsbytheir
skill level and promotes the labor market integration of migrants. Neverthe-
less,despite the significant positive net contribution of immigrants to the pub-
licsector,evenveryhighlevelsofimmigrationareinsufficienttoeliminatethe
fiscal burden that is associated with demographic aging. Auerbach/
Oreopoulos (1999) provide a similar analysis for the US. Different to Ger-
many,however,their results suggest that the fiscal contribution of immigrants
could be extremely small, reflecting the much less dramatic aging process of
the population and the already large share of foreign-born residents in the
United States.
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Those countries in the region that face an aging population have become in-
creasingly aware of the economic problems resulting from this process, lead-
ing to a debate whether immigration could provide an alleviation of these
problems. The introduction of several recent initiatives to attract immigrants
have partly been justified with the upcoming demographic problems.Most of
these programs have been initiated because of an apparent shortage of high-
skilledworkersresultingmostlyfromanincreaseddemandforhigh-skilledla-
bor.This shift in relative demand arises because of the boom of the new econ-
omy,accelerating technological process,and a re-organization of the working
environment in many firms.
Therefore, almost all migrant-receiving countries differentiate strongly
between the immigration of high- and low-skilled labor, with typically only
high-skilled workers being eligible for permanent work/residence permits,
whereasthelegalimmigrationopportunitiesforlow-skilledworkersaretight-
ened more and more. OECD (2002) and IOM (2003) outline several of the
Western European initiatives focusing on a selective policy based on higher
skills in the information technology and health industries.This skill-based en-
try system in fact is currently the main mode in which non-EU citizens can
cometoliveandworkintheEU,wherebytheemployerisgrantedapermitfor
a foreign worker if it can be shown that no appropriate native worker can be
found.The conditions under which the foreign workers are employed must be
identicaltothoseofnativeworkerswithrespecttopaymentandgeneralwork-
ing conditions.
In the UK,there was some reduction in the skills requirements for highly edu-
cated workers, such as little after-graduation labor market experience being
required,to enable employers to gain access to a wider range of work permits.
Currently, work permits can be applied for electronically, thereby reducing
transactions costs.Furthermore,if a foreign worker were to change employers
in the same field, the worker would not be required to apply for a new work
permit.InGermany,the“GreenCard”schemewasestablishedinAugust2000
to induce highly trained computer related workers to come to Germany for a
limited 5 year period.Those that did arrive on this entry scheme were mainly
from India,Russia,the Ukraine and central Europe (see Bauer,Kunze (2003)
for a detailed description). Similar to the UK and Germany, France estab-
lished a system in January 2002 to induce highly skilled workers from outside
theEUtoliveandworkinFrance.TheFrenchLaborMinistryhandledtheap-
proval procedure and, if successful for the foreign applicant, the employer’s
application was approved by the Labor Ministry and Ministry of the Interior
promptly.Finally,the US increased the annual number of H1B-visas (tempo-
rary visas for high skilled workers) several times.
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heated debate on immigration policy. This debate resulted in the establish-
ment of an immigration commission requested to produce a report with rec-
ommendations for a more coherent and comprehensive German immigration
law. The commission published its final report in July 2001. It proposed that
Germany should officially acknowledge itself as an immigration country.One
of the main arguments of the commission for the need of increased immigra-
tion to Germany were the ensuing demographic problems.7 The major practi-
cal recommendations of the commission were to introduce a coherent flexible
migration policy that allows both the immigration of temporary and perma-
nent labor migrants by applying a point-system similar to the one used in Aus-
tralia and Canada, and to introduce measures to foster the integration of im-
migrants.
It also called for measures to speed up the German asylum procedure while
recognizingGermany’sobligationsarisingfromtheGenevaRefugeeConven-
tion and the European Human Rights Convention, and to implement mea-
surestocombatillegalimmigration.Thereportbythecommissionformedthe
basis for initiating a new German immigration law.Its actual implementation
has become a lengthy process,though,laden with compromise.Its proponents
havebeenconfrontedbygrowingsecurityconcernsemergingintheaftermath
of September 11,2001.
Apart from the fact that all these initiatives are driven mainly by economic
considerations, the boom of the new economy, and the perception of an in-
creased global competition for high-skilled labor, the main policies differ
acrosscountries.WhereastheEuropeancountriesandtheUSfocusmainlyon
the temporary inflow of high-skilled workers, Australia, Canada, and New
Zealand increased their quotas for migrants selected according to the respec-
tive point systems.
Implementing these measures, the countries are in line with parts of the rec-
ommendations of international institutions, such as, for example, the recom-
mendations of the European Population conference (United Nations 1994).
These new opportunities are used by many Asian migrants as well as by indi-
viduals originating from the CEE and CIS, creating not only potential prob-
lems of a brain drain in these regions.Together with an increasing standard of
living,the emigration of mainly young workers from these countries may also
contribute to an increasing aging process in these countries.
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7 Recently,for example,the Süßmuth Commission (2001) on Migration,installed by the German
government in 2000 in order to propose a potential coherent immigration law for Germany, sta-
ted:“We need immigration to Germany because the population here is getting older:life expectancy
is increasing while the number of children born per family remains low and the number of births is
decreasing”. See www.bmi.bund.de/Annex/en_14625/Download.pdf for a full English version of
this report.Even though the aging process in many countries of the region indicates also
an increasing need for unskilled labor,especially with regard to personal ser-
vices such as the health care sector, the general policy direction still goes to-
wards the prevention of the immigration of this type of workers.This trend is
leaving unskilled migrants only the possibility of irregular immigration or the
(mis)use of the existing asylum systems. In addition, increased efforts to
tighten border controls and increased restrictions of the asylum policies
makes trafficking of human beings more profitable.
Italy could serve as an example for the increased difficulties for low-skilled
workers to move to and work in Western European countries.Italy approved
tougher laws dealing with migrants in June 2002 (OECD 2003:203).Non-EU
foreigners are fingerprinted and should a foreigner become unemployed, his
residence permit would expire,requiring him or her to leave within 6 months
(reduced from 1 year).The Italian employer would be required to provide the
unemployed migrant worker with housing and pay for the costs of expelling
theworker,clearlydisfavoringtherecruitmentoflow-skilledforeigners.Inad-
dition,foreigners leaving Italy are no longer able to reclaim pension contribu-
tions made under the social security administration.
Notethatbothillegalimmigrationandtraffickingveryoftenimplyseverevio-
lation of human rights. International organizations, such as the UNHCR and
Human Rights Watch,often point to the fact that the asylum policy of the EU
and the CEE countries that want to join the EU,but also of the traditional im-
migration countries falls short of the standards embodied in the U.N.Conven-
tionoftheStatusofRefugeesandUNHCR’sinterpretationoftheconvention.
TheyalsocriticizethatmanyimmigrationpolicyinitiativesoftheEUfocusal-
most exclusively on combating illegal immigration in the forms of smuggling
and trafficking but fails to recognize the victim protection rights of persons
who are trafficked into the union.8
4. The Performance of Migrants and the Economic Impact of Migration
Any reliable assessment of the economic impact of migration necessitates an
understanding of how immigrants contribute to the economic process at their
destination. It is certainly different whether immigrants are among the top
performers in the economy or whether they constitute a persistent economic
underclass.Thissectionwillprovideabriefsurveyoftheexistingeconomiclit-
eratureontheeconomicperformanceofimmigrants.Amoredetaileddescrip-
tion of the literature is provided by Borjas (1999) and Bauer/Zimmermann
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8 See, for example, the statement of Elizabeth Andersen “Fix it First: A Human Rights Agenda
for Extending E.U.Asylum and Migration Policy”on the occasion of the CEPS/ERA/Sitra/Tran-
scrime Conference Extending the Area of Freedom, Justice and Security through Enlargement:
Challenges for the European Union (www.hrw.org/press/2002/08/euasylum0820.htm).(2002).We then proceed to discuss the central aspects of the economic impact
ofmigration,onthesendingandthereceivingregion,andconcerningdifferent
outcome variables.Unavoidably,performance and impact are to be discussed
as two facets of the same phenomenon, as successful migrants generally tend
to foster economic prosperity among the indigenous population.
4.1 Economic Performance of Migrants
The process of economic assimilation of migrants in their destination country
has been of central concern to much of economic migration research (Bauer,
Zimmermann 2002).The focus of this literature has been on a single aspect of
this process, the relative wage dynamics of migrant workers throughout their
labor market career.Much less attention has been placed on other indicators
oftheeconomicandsocialassimilation,suchasthewelfaredependenceofmi-
grants or their accumulation of savings.Irrespective of the particular outcome
considered, it has been demonstrated in numerous studies that skills play a
dominant role for immigrant performance, whether acquired in formal
curriculae as secondary or post-secondary schooling and vocational training,
or informally as experience in the labor market,or as the manifestation of in-
trinsic personal traits such as cognitive ability or motivation.
The labor market assimilation of immigrants
Following the seminal study by Chiswick (1978),the economic literature usu-
allydiscussesthelabormarketassimilationofimmigrantswithinahumancap-
italframework.Ingeneral,migrantsacquireproductivecapacityintheirorigin
country, but only part of this human capital can be transferred to the labor
marketatthedestination.Therefore,migrantsarrivingattheirnewhomepos-
sess a lower earnings capacity than comparable natives. With time of resi-
dence, they tend to acquire the lacking human capital, such as the language
spoken at the destination – their low initial earnings capacity implies that the
opportunity cost of their investment are relatively low,making substantial hu-
mancapitalinvestmentslikely.Asthehumancapitalofthemigrantsincreases,
their earnings adjust towards those of comparable natives.
Mostempiricalanalysesoftheeconomicassimilationofimmigrantsarebased
on US data (see Borjas 1999 for a survey).Overall,the results of these studies
are mixed; the majority tends, however, towards the conclusion that immi-
grants assimilate to comparable natives. Most empirical evidence on the as-
similation of migrants in Europe use German data.9 For guest workers,the ex-
isting studies suggest an initial earnings gap to natives and no, or only very
slow assimilation of the earnings of guest workers to those of similar natives.
The empirical evidence on the labor market performance of ethnic German
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9 See,among others,Dustmann (1993) and Schmidt (1997).A survey is provided by Bauer et al.
(2000).immigrantssuggeststhatthereisneitheraninitialearningsgapnoranyassimi-
lation pattern. Studies for the UK tend to conclude that there is no earnings
disadvantage of white immigrants and that non-white foreign-born earn sub-
stantiallylessthanwhitenatives.Withregardtotheearningsassimilationwith
time of residence the results are not conclusive.10
Winter-Ebmer (1994) finds that guest workers in Austria display an earnings
disadvantage and a flatter experience-wage profile than natives. Immigrants
who arrived in Sweden during the labor recruitment period appear to have
performed quite well in the Swedish labor market (see,e.g.Ekberg 1994).Re-
cent immigrants to Sweden,however,appear not to assimilate to the earnings
of otherwise comparable natives (Edin et al. 2000). Assimilation studies for
other European countries are rather rare,which could either be explained by
the lack of appropriate data or the lack of experience with substantial immi-
gration.
Four main lessons can be learned from existing assimilation studies (Bauer et
al.2000).First,the skill endowment of migrants and investments into the spe-
cific human capital of the receiving country,such as language abilities are im-
portantfactorsforafastassimilationintothelabormarketofthereceivingre-
gion. Second, country-of-origin differences and admission criteria have a
stronginfluenceonthelabormarketperformanceofimmigrants.Third,nearly
all countries recently experienced a decline in the so-called “quality”of immi-
grants,asmeasuredbytheuponarrivalimmigrant-nativewagegap.Thisholds
trueforcountrieswithafocusonfamilyreunification,aswellascountrieswith
a selective immigration policy.In almost all cases the decrease in the “quality”
ofthemigrantsisrelatedtoachangeinthecountry-of-origin-mixoftheimmi-
grants.The evidence indicates that especially migrants from different cultural
background and from different schooling systems, compared to the culture
and schooling system of the receiving country, are responsible for the quality
decrease.Examples are Mexicans and Asians in the US,Asians in Canada and
New Zealand and refugees in Europe.Fourth,even though all countries face a
decrease in the “quality” of immigrants, an assimilation of immigrants labor
earnings up to the level of wages of native workers can only be observed in
those countries that are selecting their migrants according to labor market
characteristics such as in Canada and New Zealand.
The empirical controversies remaining are mainly of technical nature. Most
existingeconometricanalysesontherelativelabormarketperformanceofmi-
grants rest their interpretation on a crucial identification assumption,namely
that wages perfectly reflect productive capacities. Wage differences can only
be used as a perfect measure of disparities in economic productivity,though,if
the labor market functions without any trace of discrimination and any legal
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10 See Hatton/Wheatley Price (1999) for a survey of the literature on migration in the UK.barriers to wage parity.On the other hand,following some recent analyses in
interpreting any unexplained wage differential as a reflection of discrimina-
tionwouldrequireanequallystrongandhardlymoreplausibleimplicitidenti-
fication assumption – the absence of migrant-native differences in productive
capacity once formal characteristics are controlled for. However, both inter-
pretations rest on empirically untestable identification assumptions, i.e. they
rest on assumptions maintained to hold true to allow the interpretation of re-
duced-form wage dynamics in terms of structural ideas (assimilation or dis-
crimination). Therefore, the decisive problem is: what is the valid identifica-
tion assumption? This question cannot be answered unequivocally and must
remain a matter of economic reasoning alone.
Similarconsiderationspertaintotheroleofcohorteffects,ortheobservedde-
crease in immigrant quality. It has been argued adamantly by Borjas (1987,
1991)anddiscussedintenselybysubsequentanalysts(see,e.g.LaLonde,Topel
1991) that the inherent productive capacity of immigrant cohorts to the US
variesdrasticallyovertime.Specifically,theextentofthisvariationanditslink
to changes in the legal setting are at issue.Again,a fundamental identification
problem arises,since the impact of economic assimilation,the affiliation with
varyingcohorts,andtheeffectofachangingwagedistributioncannotbeiden-
tified separately without further identification assumptions. Based on the lit-
eraturewecanonlyconcludethatthecountry-of-origincompositionofrecent
migrants has become more diverse,a pattern which is associated with a strong
decline in relative education levels of migrants compared to natives in some
destinations.Theevidenceonthedistributionofunobservedtraitsisinconclu-
sive,though,andthisissuepromisestoremaincontroversialinyearstocome.
The welfare dependence of immigrants
Oneofthemostcontentiousissuesinthecontextofimmigrationandimmigra-
tion policy regards the welfare state. Indeed, Borjas (1999) places the debate
on immigration welfare dependence on equal footing with the “classical”top-
ics of immigrants’ labor market performance and their labor market impact.
The concern over this problem in principle reflects legitimate reservations
about the fiscal and political viability of a welfare state potentially acting as a
magnet to migrants,yet being underwritten by a native electorate.
Neither the empirical results regarding the trends in immigrant welfare nor
the institutional arrangements shaping the environment for immigrants’ wel-
fare use are easily translated from the US (Blau 1984;Borjas,Trejo 1991,1993;
Borjas,Hilton 1996),Canada (Baker,Benjamin 1995) or the UK (Blundell et
al.1988) to the context of other countries in the region.Most of all,the histori-
cal developments governing size and composition of immigrant influx to the
countries were quite distinct.
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of Levine/Zimmermann (1999).They utilize the quasi-laboratory nature pro-
vided by the idiosyncratically acting US states to approximate as closely as
possible an appropriately designed experiment. In sum, they find little evi-
dence for the welfare magnet hypothesis. Unfortunately, despite its impor-
tance for the assessment of the impact of immigration,the empirical literature
for Europe is rather scarce, with Blundell et al. (1988) for the UK, and
Riphahn (1998) and Fertig/Schmidt (2001) for Germany being three out of a
small list of exceptions. In particular, the latter study suggests that, while the
population of non-citizens in Germany indeed displays relatively large wel-
faredependence,thisrelativepatternisturnedonitsheadwhenonecompares
genuinely comparable individuals.
That is, the apparently high welfare dependence of migrants is a reflection of
the guest-worker recruitment policy of the late 1960s and early 1970s – which
was mainly seeking to attract unskilled workers and their families. Thus to-
day’s high welfare dependence is not a reflection of low intrinsic qualities
among migrants, but rather of the continuing importance of formal skills on
the German labor market.If this pattern holds true for all future immigration,
the message for immigration policy is clear and unmistakable: pursuing a de-
liberate and systematic immigration policy which balances human rights and
the country’s human capital requirements is the best option to assure that fu-
ture immigrants will not become clients of the welfare system in any dispro-
portionate fashion.
The descendants of immigrants
The European migration experience of the 1960s and 1970s has been domi-
nated by labor migration from Europe’s South to Western and Northern
Europe. Since then, the ethnic composition of immigration to Europe has
changeddramaticallyovertime.Europeasawholehasbecomeanetreceiving
region, and the geographic, economic, and cultural distances to the immi-
grants’ countries of origin have increased significantly. As a consequence of
the continuous influx from these different sources, many European societies
today contain large immigrant populations. Moreover the children of immi-
grants are a sizeable fraction of the younger European population. A casual
glance at the low economic status of second-generation foreigners might sug-
gest that we currently observe a process of transition from immigrant commu-
nities to persistent ethnic minorities.
Yet, despite its relevance for all European countries almost no research has
targeted the question of their integration into the society,neither in compari-
son to the integration of their fathers’ generation nor to natives of the same
age,norarethepotentialconsequencesofdifferentpoliciesregardingtheirin-
tegration fully understood.One exception is a recent symposium published in
28 Thomas K. Bauer, John P. Haisken-DeNew and Christoph M. Schmidtthe Journal of Population Economics, which addresses the interplay between
immigrant economic attainment across generations and the economic and
regulatory environment (Card,Schmidt 2003).From an empirical and a theo-
retical perspective the symposium covers two connected themes, (i) the skill
acquisition,entrance into the labor market,and subsequent labor market suc-




is that the 1960s and 1970s saw a fairly good economic integration of immi-
grantsintothereceivingeconomies.InEurope,thisprocessofassimilationhas
been weakened during the post-1970 period.The unsatisfactory performance
of the descendants of immigrants accounts for a substantial part of this deteri-
oration. In contrast to the European countries, the good performance of sec-
ond-generation immigrants in the US labor market can mostly be traced to
theirdisproportionatelyhigheducationalendowments.Thesedifferencessug-
gest that investment into human capital and their subsequent transition from
school to work differ between the children of immigrants and comparable na-
tives or first-generation immigrants.
Theavailablepapersoverwhelminglyidentifyparentaleducationasanimpor-
tant factor for the educational attainment and, consequently, the economic
performance of second-generation foreigners. This result should be the basis
for any educated immigration policy. A receiving country which manages to
attract immigrants with a high education profile will tend to experience well
integrated and economically successful generations of these immigrants’ chil-
dren. In addition, several papers have demonstrated that there is also an im-
portant feedback from the second to the first generation.In their location de-
cision, potential migrants are concerned of their children’s future opportuni-
ties.Thus,if immigration policy attempts to generate a favorable composition
of the influx of first-generation immigrants, it should offer sufficient integra-
tion opportunities for the migrants’ children.
4.2 Impact of Migration
Thethirdareaofmigrationresearchisconcernedwiththeimpactofmigration
on both the economy and population of the receiving region and the economy
and population of the sending region.As discussed in section 2,there is also a
third group of countries that experience transit migration. To the extent that
transitmigrantsenterthelabormarketofthetransitregionsinordertoobtain
the financial resources to move,all the considerations of the impact of migra-
tiononthereceivingcountryinprinciplealsoappliestothesetransitcountries.
Therefore, we will only differentiate between sending and receiving regions
International Labor Migration, Economic Growth and Labor Markets 29for the rest of this section. In addition, following the economic literature on
the impact of migration we also do not explicitly differentiate between eco-
nomic and non-economic migrants. Finally, to our knowledge there exist no
studies on the economic impact of migration for the CEE countries of the re-
gion.Therefore,concerningtheeconomicimpactonthereceivingcountrythis
sectionconcentratesonlyonNorthAmericaandtheEU.However,thediscus-
sion on the economic effects of migration on the sending region in principle
also applies to the sending regions among the CEE countries.
We start with a brief survey of the existing literature on the economic impact
of migration on the receiving region taking a microeconomic and macroeco-
nomic perspective. Then we discuss the so-called brain drain discussion per-
taining to the consequences of international migration for the sending coun-
tries. Note that we have already covered some other important issues on the
effects of migrants on natives by discussing the effects on migrants on the wel-
faresysteminsection4.1andthefiscalcontributionofimmigrantsinsection2.
The economic impact on the receiving region
The empirical assessment of relative individual economic performance ap-
pears to be straightforward as a conceptual issue.It is a matter of direct com-
parisonofanappropriateoutcomemeasure,i.e.wagesoremploymentsuccess,
between the individuals of interest – migrants – and a comparison group – na-
tives. By contrast, the economic impact of immigration unfolds in an indirect
fashionviamarketreactions,andisthereforemuchmorecomplexasanobject
ofinvestigation.Friedberg/Hunt(1995),andBauer/Zimmermann(2002)offer
surveys of the theoretical and empirical literature on the economic impacts of
migration.
Conceptually, additional immigration shifts the relevant labor supply curve
outward–withthefirstproblemforanyempiricalstrategyarisingastheques-
tionwhatexactlyis“relevant”,thelocallabormarket,theskillgroupetc.?The
consequences, in terms of employment and wages for this relevant group, as
well as for all other groups of labor (with unskilled native workers being the
most prominent case in the public debate) are first of all a matter of their own
elasticities of demand and supply and of the set of elasticities of complemen-
tarity with all other production factors.Equilibrating migration that reacts to
imbalances of supply and demand of specific skills is likely to be beneficial on
twoaccounts.Firstly,sinceitreactstoskillshortages,itisunlikelytocrowdout
comparable native labor.And secondly,skilled workers often tend to be com-
plementary production factors to unskilled native workers, lifting their labor
market prospects as well.
The additional labor supply is, however, only part of the story, since product
demand,andthuslabordemand(onallothersub-markets)tendtobeaffected
positively. On balance, it might not be the case at all that immigration harms
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workers.In fact,the matter is entirely empirical.Nevertheless,even at the the-
oretical level many facets relevant for the real world might complicate the
analysis,for instance the necessity to account for an increasing variety of pro-
ducts via immigration,or the consequences of institutionalized wage rigidities
(Schmidt et al.1994).
The main empirical problem confronted by this line of research is to isolate
immigration-inducedshiftsinlaborsupplywhichcanbetreatedasiftheywere
set in an ideal experiment,in other words as exogenous.Several strategies can
be found in the literature regarding the definition of the appropriate sub-mar-
ket. All these analyses face the common problem of non-experimental re-
search: the extent of additional immigration does not vary randomly across
timeandspace,asinalaboratoryexperiment,butisrathertheoutcomeofsys-
tematicforces.Specifically,moreattractivedestinationswilltypicallygenerate
a larger influx of immigrants. Comparing the relevant economic outcome
measures, native employment rates say, across regions will typically confuse
the impact of immigration with the underlying reason making the area parti-
cularly attractive.
Two main approaches have been used to estimate the impact of immigration
on the labor market outcomes of natives. Several studies estimate a produc-
tion function to calculate the elasticity of substitution between immigrants
and natives.Most existing studies,however,look at the labor market effects of
immigration on natives by estimating a reduced-form wage or unemployment
equation,where the share of immigrants in a region or an industry is the main
explanatory variable of interest. To circumvent the potential endogeneity
problemmentionedabove,mostauthorsrelyoninstrumentalvariableestima-
tions. Another approach to avoid biases in the analysis of the wage and em-
ployment effects of immigration is to analyze natural experiments in immigra-
tion,wherethetimingandthelocationofimmigrationisnoteconomicallymo-
tivated. These natural experiments provide interesting evidence on the labor
market effects of immigration,because they utilize events that resulted in ex-
ogenous migration flows to approximate as close as possible an appropriately
designed experiment. Examples of such studies are Card (1990) who investi-
gates the migration of Cubans to Miami around the May 1980 Mariel boatlift,
Hunt (1992) who looks at the repatriation of Algerians to France resulting
from the Algerian independence in 1962,and Carrington/de Lima (1996) who
investigate the return of colonialists from Africa to Portugal after the revolu-
tion in 1974.All of these studies suggest only a negligible impact of immigra-
tion on natives.
Existing empirical evidence on the economic impact of immigration suggests
that the derivation of robust qualitative results is a difficult, if not hopeless
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thephenomenon.Asatentativesummary,itseemsapparentthatanydisplace-
ment effects of additional migration are small in magnitude,with zero being a
plausible point estimate.Reviewing the North American literature on this is-
sue, Friedberg/Hunt (1995, p. 42) conclude: “Economic theory is equivocal,
and empirical estimates in a variety of settings and using a variety of ap-
proaches have shown that the effect of immigration on the labor market out-
comes of natives is small.There is no evidence of economically significant re-
ductions in native employment.” Reviewing the European literature, Bauer/
Zimmermann(2002)cometoasimilarconclusion.Sofarithasnotbeenpossi-
bletoquantifyanyofthepresumablypositivedemandsideeffectsworkingvia
goods markets, let alone indirect (positive) effects of increasing variety of
products and services,or (negative) effects of excessive crowding on the hous-
ing market.
Recent theoretical work has made substantial progress in providing explana-
tions for the link between migration and economic growth in the receiving
country.11 In a simple neoclassical growth model,where production is a func-
tionoflaborandhumancapitalwhichareinternationallymobile,andphysical
capital which is immobile, where there is no trade between countries, and
where exogenous technological progress is the principal driving force of eco-
nomic growth,the human capital endowments of migrants turn out to be a de-
cisivefactorofeconomicgrowth.Thekeyiswhetherimmigrantsbringenough
human capital along with them to compensate for the attenuation of physical
capital in the receiving country.In this setting,immigrants with a little human
capital endowment slow down per capita growth while immigrants with a suf-
ficiently high endowment of human capital will speed up per capita growth.
This argument would even be emphasized in models of endogenous growth.
Compared to the theoretical literature,there are only a few empirical studies
on the link between immigration and growth.Overall the results of these em-
pirical studies come to conflicting results (Friedberg, Hunt 1995). Barro/
Sala-i-Martin (1992), for example, find for the US and Japan that migration
has a positive, though small effect on growth. Concluding that migration is
negatively related to the convergence between regions, which could be inter-
preted as recovery from shocks or as short-term growth,the empirical results
of Blanchard/Katz (1992) and Dolado et al.(1993),however,are at odds with
those of Barro/Sala-i-Martin (1992). The lack of evidence and the conflicting
results indicate that much more research is needed on this important issue.
The economic impact on the sending country
After a few decades of relatively limited attention to the issue, recent years
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11 A detailed discussion of this issue is provided by Barro/Sala-i-Martin (1995). See also Roth-
gang/Schmidt (2003) and the survey by Friedberg/Hunt (1995).have witnessed an intense debate on the extent and the consequences of
so-called brain drain migration. This growing attention can be explained by
various factors such as the increased importance of high-skilled migration,to-
gether with an increased competition by industrialized countries for high-
skilledlabor,bytheincreasingimportanceoftheNewEconomyandtheinter-
nationalization of multinational firms’ internal and external labor markets.
An additional reason is the increased demand for workers in the health care
sector which results from an aging population in many developed countries
(see also the discussion in section 2).
Despite the intensity of the debate, the precise nature of the migration of
high-skilled labor is far from well understood. While the increasing impor-
tance of high-skilled migration seems indisputable, we don’t know whether
this trend will accelerate further.Similarly,the prevalence of temporary spells
of migration might even increase. Beyond the necessity of predicting these
trendsintothefuture,theireffectsarerelativelyunclear.Despitealargeseries
of theoretical contributions to the brain drain literature, it is not even trans-
parentwhetherthereisindeedanegativeeffectofthebraindrainonthecoun-
tries of emigration.Certainly,the loss of educated workers tends to harm ori-
gin countries,but the possibility for future migration might establish an incen-
tive for increased accumulation of human capital,a countervailing effect.This
maybeasbeneficialasmigrantremittancesandtheeffectsofreturnmigration
of skilled workers.Finally,the presence of high-skilled workers may have con-
siderable implications for the speed of technological diffusion,the location of
new business ventures, and more generally on economic growth. Similarly,
flexiblelabormayplayanimportantroleinalleviatingthedetrimentsofstruc-
tural change and unemployment (Rothgang,Schmidt 2003).
Static models on international migration,which dominated the earlier debate
on brain drain in the 1960s, are set in terms of perfectly competitive markets,
with wages equal to marginal products and no externalities. In a basic frame-
work, only negligible adverse welfare implications arise for the non-migrants
left behind (Grubel, Scott 1966). However, with international mobile capital,
thisconclusionhastobemodified(Berry,Soligo1969).Whentherearedistor-
tions in wage setting (Bhagwati, Namada 1974; Schmidt et al. 1994), interna-
tionalmigrationoftheskilledislikelytoimplynegativewelfareeffectsforun-
skilledworkersinthesendingcountry.Ifeducationissubsidized,international
integration of the skilled labor market imposes a cost on the sending country,
asmoreworkersacquireskillsandemigratethereafter.Despiteaweakempir-
ical foundation – the analysis focused on the distinction of skilled and un-
skilled workers at the aggregate level, yet never at the level of individual
agents or firms – the policy prescriptions emerging from this literature are
clear-cut:Developed economies as the recipients of skills should compensate
the sending LDCs by way of a brain drain tax (Bhagwati, Hamada 1974;
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dence for more private investment in human capital into ICT skills which
would lessen the problem in the latter case.
However,these static models do take into account several dynamic aspects in
the migration decision that are of special importance for the analysis of the ef-
fects of high-skilled migration. Some of the dynamic models of international
migration emphasize that the possibility of later emigration encourages indi-
vidualsinthesendingregionstoinvestinhumancapital.Inthatcase,theinter-
national integration of the skilled labor market might generate an excess of
skill formation over the loss of emigrating skills.Thus,positive externalities of
skill acquisition arise also for those not acquiring the skills (Beine et al.2001;
Stark et al.1997,1998;Vidal 1998).Not all of the additional skilled workers do
indeedmigrate–exposttheymightnothaveinvestedintoskills,sincetheydid
not migrate after all.A positive effect of integrating international markets for
skilled labor is that the marginal individual in education faces a positive prob-
ability for emigrating later on. Stark et al. (1997) presume that only after the
initial migration of skilled workers, firms in the receiving regions are able to
screen their new workers for unobserved ability;yet even the returning work-
ers have acquired the skills in the first place.However,it is extremely difficult
to generate empirical evidence for these arguments, due to the simultaneous
nature of education, migration and economic activity. Attempts have been
made by Beine et al.(2001),Faini (2002),and Rothgang/Schmidt (2003).
Anotherimportantchannelforabraingaineffectisprovidedbyreturnmigra-
tion.Specifically,migrantsreturningtotheiroriginmaybringelementsofpro-
ductive capacity to the origin economy which they could only have acquired
abroad. This is most obviously the case for skills such as techniques, business
strategies, or modern forms of work organization. Some of these aspects will
be acquired through simple inspection; others require a longer exposure and
the active accumulation of experience during their operation. Migrants fre-
quently return to their origin country at an advanced stage of their career,but
before ultimately entering retirement. Such return migrants often intend to
start their own business, having acquired relatively considerable financial re-





Since migration arguably entails important effects,both in terms of economic
growthandthedistributionofeconomicprosperity,andforthesocialfabricof
receiving populations, it is important to gather information on the future de-
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ture migration policy, but in turn migration policy will influence how this po-
tential is translated into actual migration,and to which destinations.Here we
briefly discuss these future prospects.
Newly emerging concerns of existing migration flows in the region
The region is facing several new concerns regarding the further liberalization
of migration flows.Many of these concerns are nurtured by the events of Sep-
tember 11, 2001 which initiated a debate about internal and external security
issues. With the exception of the North American countries, these concerns
have had only a small impact on immigration policies yet,although in general,
many countries have tightened their immigration systems.Most measures im-
plemented after September 11 aimed to improve the controls of persons en-
teringaparticularcountry,includingstrongersecuritymeasuresattheborders
and at the domestic and international airports. Since tighter borders controls
are only of limited value in preventing international terrorism,there is an on-
going debate in most important destination countries on the potential to im-
prove the existing identification systems and to increase the effectiveness of
information-sharing and data-exchange between the immigration authorities
and the police.
A second important issue focuses on the increasing importance of illegal mi-
gration and trafficking.Countries are affected by illegal migration in very dif-
ferent ways, determined largely by geographical characteristics. The US, for
example,isfacingmainlyillegalmigrationfromMexico,whereasgeographical
peculiarities make illegal immigration and trafficking of migrants a rather
negligible problem in Canada.In Western Europe,mainly the Southern Euro-
pean states Italy and Spain face increasing problems with illegal immigration
and trafficking.These countries are both,a major destination country for ille-
gal migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees as well as a transit country for mi-
grants who aim seek their fortune in Northern Europe.A prominent example
of a country with increasing illegal immigration despite its limited geograph-
ical accessibility is the UK,which faced an increasing influx of asylum seekers
andillegalmigrantsviatheEurotunnel.Finally,manyCEEcountriesaswellas
the Balkan states became major crossroads for illegal migrants seeking their
way from East to West.
The major policy reaction to the increased inflow of illegal migrants has been
the tightening of border controls.A number of countries introduced stiff pen-
alties for traffickers,including prison sentences;others (Italy,Belgium and the
Netherlands) have addressed the issue by granting victims some form of resi-
dence status while serving as witnesses against the traffickers; and a third
group of countries (Belgium, France, Greece, Portugal and Spain) have used
regularization programs to change the status of irregular migrants.
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tential increase of East-West migration that may result from the enlargement
of the EU towards CEE countries. Existing studies on potential migration
flows from the East to the West after an enlargement of the EU arrive at
rather different results.12 The structure of migration flows between the associ-
ated CEE countries and the current EU-member countries suggests that po-
tential East-West migration flows will be largely temporary, whereas perma-
nent migration from these countries will be mainly directed towards the tradi-
tional immigration countries in North America, Australia and New Zealand
(IOM 1998).The discussion has also shown that there are very different views
among the current member states concerning the freedom of labor mobility
between the new and the old member states after enlargement, with some
countries asking to restrict the freedom of movement for a limited period of
time,as it was the case when Spain and Portugal joined the EU in 1986,while
others promote the immediate implementation of freedom of labor mobility
betweenthenewandtheoldmembers.Attheend,GermanyandAustriahave
succeeded in negotiating transitional periods allowing them to protect their
domestic employment markets for a maximum of seven years.
Anissuethathasreceivedalmostnoattentioninthemediaandthepublicdis-
cussion concerns problems associated with ethnic migration.Again,this prob-
lem exists mainly for Europe.As already noted in section 1,there are continu-
ing large scale migration flows within the CEE countries which were initiated
by the fall of the iron curtain. In addition, many descendants of former mi-
grants appear to take the opportunity to return to the country of their ances-
tors.Sofar,thistypeofimmigrationoccurredmainlyinGermany.Inthe1990s,
Germany received more than 2.5 million ethnic Germans from the former
USSR, Romania, and Poland. In the last few years, the inflow of ethnic Ger-
mans decreased substantially, partly because of a tightening of the entry pro-
ceduresandpartlybecausetherearenotmanyethnicGermansleftinEastern
Europe (see Bauer et.al.2003 for a more detailed discussion).
Ethnic migration from people originating in Eastern Europe is also experi-
encedbyTurkey,receivingethnicTurksfromBulgaria,andFinland,facingim-
migration of ethnic Fins from the Balkan and the former USSR. Much less is
known about newly emerging flows of ethnic migrants into Ireland, Italy,
Spain,andtheUK.Becauseofadeteriorationoftheeconomicand/orpolitical
situation,persons of British origin living in Zimbabwe or South Africa are in-
creasingly returning to the UK.The economic crisis in Argentina has initiated
increasing immigration from Latin America into Italy and Spain. Finally, the
economic boom in Ireland led to an increasing inflow of Americans of Irish
origin into Ireland. Our knowledge about the size and persistence of these
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12 SeethecontroversialviewsinBauer/Zimmermann(1999),Fertig(2001),Sinn(1999,2002)and
Fertig/Schmidt (2001).flows is rather rudimentary.Consistent data exists only in a few cases (for ex-
ample in Germany) and the governments of the destination regions are in
many cases not willing to start a broad discussion on this type of migrants.
Another concern regarding future migration originates from the increasing
importance of the New Economy and the globalization of labor and goods
markets. Specifically, the observed increasing flows of highly skilled migrants
have been associated with the emergence of skill-biased technical change in
the developed labor markets, which in turn is frequently viewed as a conse-
quence of the rising diffusion of ICT and, more generally, of the radical
re-structuring of the organization of work. Prominent examples for migrants
of the New Economy era are programmers from countries like India moving
in response to employment opportunities to developed countries and venture
capitalists all over the world who are attracted by profit prospects in destina-
tions such as the US. Migration is also caused by the internationalization of
multinational firms’ internal and external labor markets. If, as often argued,
there is indeed a trend towards a relentlessly increasing international demand
for skilled labor, caused by the further diffusion of ICT, advanced economies
could even intensify their efforts to attract such workers away from their ori-
gin countries. An intensified competition of developed countries for
high-skilled workers, which manifests itself already in the various new immi-
gration initiatives described above,and a serious brain drain might be the im-
mediate consequence.
The developments that are directly or indirectly associated with the produc-
tion and use of ICT technologies have fundamental consequences for core
questionsofmigrationandoughttoshapethemigrationstreamsofthefuture.
Most importantly,a direct channel of influence is likely to run from increasing
wage premia for skills to an acceleration of high-skilled migration. Yet, al-
though in the recent past the importance of high-skilled migration has in-
creased distinctively, it is far from clear whether the development and diffu-
sion of ICT will lead to a dramatic increase in international migration of the
highly skilled. The emergence of the New Economy makes factual migration
lessimportantasbusinesscanbedoneacrossspaceinacompletelynewway.13
Policy options on migration:control or management?
Apart from the traditional immigration countries,Canada,Australia and New
Zealand,and the US,most countries in the region did not consider themselves
as immigration countries,even though many of them experienced large immi-
gration flows. Because of this attitude, European countries followed a “zero-
immigration”policyforthelastthreedecades.Theimmigrationpolicyofthese
countriesmainlyfocusedonentrycontrolandtheregulationofpermissionsto
stay and to work in the country. These policies, together with a tendency of
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countries to a system of very complicated institutions,ranging from a plethora
of different types of entry,stay and work permissions,over different forms of
access for similar persons to state benefits,to different regulations concerning
repatriation and re-immigration.14
Often, there is no coordination between different government agencies deal-
ingwithdifferentmigration-relatedissues.Inmanycountries,forexample,the
ministryofinteriororjusticeisresponsiblefortheentryandstayofforeigners,
whereas the ministry of labor deals with issues concerning permissions to
work. The spreading of responsibilities across different agencies and the lack
of cooperation has frequently resulted in inconsistent legislation. It has fur-
ther been argued that the lack of possibilities to immigrate on a legal basis is
one important explanation for the increasing number of illegal migrants and
associated issues such as increased exploitation and trafficking of migrants
and the misuse of the existing asylum systems.Finally,since most countries in
Europe did not consider themselves as being immigration countries,there is a
widespread lack of integration policies,which resulted in additional social and
economic problems concerning not only first-generation but also second- and
third-generation immigrants.15
Overall,ithastobeconcludedthatthepresentsystemofmigrationcontrolhas
proved to be inefficient in dealing with the new migration problems that have
been developing through increasing globalization, i.e. increasingly integrated
international economies and labor markets, and through the demographic
challenges that many countries in the region will face in the coming decades.
Many governments in the region seem to realize now that they have to change
their migration policy and that these changes require a more comprehensive
approach to manage migration in order to reap the potential gains of migra-
tion without incurring too many of its potential costs. It has further been ar-
gued that such a comprehensive policy could contribute in reducing xenopho-
bia. For example, it has been observed that xenophobia tends to be lower in
countries that follow a comprehensive migration policy, such as for example
Canada (Bauer et al.2000).
Following the lines of the United Nations (1994) and the IOM (2003), such a
comprehensive approach towards an efficient management should include,
among others,the following basic elements:(i) opportunities for both tempo-
rary and permanent immigration including labor migration programmes;
(ii) effective border management to increase security,to combat illegal migra-
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14 See,for example,Bauer et.al.(2004) for a detailed description of the current German institu-
tionsconcerningtheentry,stayandworkpermissionsforforeigners,whichcouldbeconsideredto
be representative for many European countries.
15 See,for example,Fertig/Schmidt (2003) and the literature cited in there.tiontogetherwithsmugglingandtrafficking,andtosustaintheintegrityofthe
asylum system; (iii) integration of immigrants in the society and economy of
the host country; (iv) recognition and respect of the rights of all type of mi-
grants,and (v) measures that address the main causes of emigration,including
investmentsanddevelopmentaidtofosterthedevelopmentofthesendingre-
gions and a foreign policy that aims to avoid new massive flows of refugees.In
addition,a comprehensive migration approach should be flexible enough not
only to react to gradual changes but also to often unexpected short-term
changes in migration trends and the economic and social environment.
Toestablishsuchacomprehensivepolicyitwouldbenecessarytoincreasethe
cooperation of national agencies that deal with migration issues,increased in-
ternational cooperation in order to share information on migration-related is-
sues and harmonize migration policies,and the improvement of the availabil-
ity of information on migration legislation and of data on migration.The Ger-
man discussion on a new immigration policy in the last two years could serve
as a good example of this changing attitude towards immigration policy. The




essary for an effective management of migration,even though these attempts
are just in their infancy. A by-product of the events of September 11 is an in-
creased co-operation in and debate on potential strategies to improve the ex-
isting identification systems and to increase the effectiveness of informa-
tion-sharing and data-exchange between the immigration authorities and the
police within the potential destination regions as well as between the regions
and the sending countries.





eigner enters EU-territory,the further migration of this person can no longer
be controlled.As a result of free labor and product markets within the EU,in-
dividual member countries are unable to follow independent migration poli-
cies without potentially harming other members. The asylum policy in many
Europeancountriessincetheearly1990s,whichhasshownthattheimplemen-
tation of tighter asylum and immigration laws in one country automatically
leadtoanincreaseofasylumseekersandimmigrantsinneighboringcountries,
could act as a good example for this interdependence. Therefore, the EU
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however,just in its infancy.
Since1988,themigrationpolicyoftheEUismarkedbytwodifferentdevelop-
ments. First, since the original Treaty of Rome in 1957, internal migration
within the EU has been steadily liberalized, concluding in Article 8a of the
Single European Act. This Act requires the achievement of the free move-
ment of people, capital, goods, and services by 1 January, 1993, implying the
abolishment of controls on the interior borders of the EU. Second, with re-
spect to immigration from outside the EU,there have been increasing efforts
to establish a unified,though in many cases more restrictive policy.The devel-
opment towards a joint EU migration policy started with the Schengen Ac-
cordsofJune1985(SchengenI),19June,1990(SchengenII),andtheaccordof
Dublinon15June,1990,continuingwiththeMaastrichtTreatyof1992andthe
Amsterdam Treaty of 1997,which came into force in 1999.
The last milestone of this process could be seen in the special meeting of the
European Council in Tampere (Finland) in October 1999,where the Heads of
State and Government agreed upon a program of action including the devel-
opment of a common EU policy on asylum and migration.So far,the main ob-
jectives of these initiatives are as follows:to eliminate internal border checks,
to establish consistent and tighter external border controls,a unified visa pol-
icy, and the co-ordination of different national asylum policies and measures
to fight illegal migration. Furthermore, the objectives comprise the elabora-
tionofjointnormsregardingtheacceptanceofasylumseekers,generatingthe
prerequisites for immigration and residence of immigrants from countries
outside the EU,and formulating the rights and conditions under which immi-
grants of one EU member country can reside in another member country.
Apartfromthedevelopmentofanincreasinglyintegratedgoodsandfinancial
markets within NAFTA, a similar development could not be observed in
North-America.The objective there is rather to limit migration,especially be-
tween Mexico and the US. It is further unclear whether the NAFTA agree-
mentshavereducedorincreasedmigrationbetweentheassociatedcountries.
International co-operation in the field of migration has also occurred with re-
gard to regulations concerning temporary migration.18 Germany,for example,
has signed bilateral agreements with several CEE countries concerning the
admission of temporary workers (Bauer, Zimmermann 1999). The following
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17 A general analysis of migration policy issues is given by Straubhaar/Zimmermann (1993) and
Zimmermann (1995). See also IOM (2003, chapter 14) for a detailed description of the common
migration policy within the EU.
18 A detailed discussion of the characteristics of and the legislation on temporary migration in
Australia,Canada,France,Germany,the Netherlands,Switzerland,the United Kingdom,and the
US is given by OECD (1998).goals were at the core of these bilateral agreements: (i) to bring the CEEC-
countries up to Western European standards;(ii) solidarity with CEEC-coun-
tries;(iii) to impart skills to firms and workers with modern technology in or-
der to foster economic development in the countries of origin;(iv) to decrease
the immigration pressure from these countries;and (v) to promote economic
co-operation with these countries.




tion of Western standards with regard to border controls and asylum laws,
could rather be seen as the attempt to create a “buffer zone” at the Union’s
eastern border.This buffer would shift part of the problem of fighting irregu-
lar migration and of the asylum problem towards the East by promoting the
creation of asylum laws according to Western standards and the “safe third
country concept”.Accordingly,the vast majority of cooperative measures be-
tween EU member states and the associated CEE countries concentrate on
restrictivemeasuresforfightingillegalimmigrationratherthanonthepromo-
tion of humanitarian standards in dealing with immigrants (Subhan 1998).
Overall,even though many important receiving countries realize the need for
amoreinternationallycooperativemigrationpolicy,thedevelopmentofinter-
national cooperation seems to kick off rather slowly. Together with apparent
problems in developing similar institutions from the existing institution in the
countries,one reason for this slow development may be seen in the increased
world-wide competition for high-skilled labor. Other reasons are historical
migration links and ethnic migration flows, on which many countries are un-
willing to discuss in an international setting.
Future of migration in the region
Assessing migration potentials and predicting future migration streams are
among the most relevant, yet least well understood topics of migration re-
search.Multiple push and pull factors are responsible for observed migration
flows, including for example, economic and social differences between coun-
tries,migration networks,different population and aging trends,environmen-
tal problems,reduced transportation and information costs as well as various
political factors, including armed conflicts, and the violation of human rights.
Theoreticalmodelsandempiricalstudiesofthedeterminantsofmigrationare
only able to capture a subset of the various factors determining human migra-
tion either because models that aim to describe as many determinants of mi-
gration as possible would become by far too complicated or because the pau-
cityoftheavailabledatamaterialandtheinterrelationshipbetweenthediffer-
entfactorsofmigrationmakesthepreciseestimationandidentificationofhis-
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terminants difficult.19 The usual approach taken in economic analyses is to fit
ad hoc specifications to historical, aggregate-level data, and for purposes of
prediction to extrapolate from these estimates on the basis of auxiliary condi-
tioning information. However, as already mentioned in section 2, no stable
patterns emerge from studies on the determinants of migration whatsoever,
limiting the reliability of this type of forecasts.
Even if these problems could be solved,the usefulness of precise estimates of
historical relationships between demographic and economic determinants
and the resulting migration streams would be rather limited. A second and
conceptually more severe problem is the identification problem that has to be
solved satisfactorily for any valid extrapolation, irrespective of the available
data points. Intellectually, the forecasting problem arises because the future
will be going to be different from the past,while the key to its solution lies in
finding sufficient aspects of stability to be able to learn from the past (Fertig,
Schmidt 2001). Changes in the various determinants of human migration are
not only gradual both across time and across space;even the temporal devel-
opment of many determinants of migration face abrupt changes and are very
hardtopredict.Theoverallmigrationexperienceinthelastdecadehasfurther
shown that migration flows do not occur necessarily between the traditional
origin and destination region.Migration increasingly takes place between two
regions that do not share a common migration history.20
Before this background, the following description of potential future migra-
tion flows should be seen as speculative, because the institutional, economic
and demographic factors that form the basis of these trends could change
rather rapidly. For the same reason, we refrain from quantifying potential fu-
turemigrationflowsand,inmostcases,fromcharacterizingthecompositionof
the migration flows into labor migrants, family migrants and asylum seekers
and refugees,and permanent and temporary migrants.
Thecurrenteconomicanddemographicdevelopmentsuggeststhattheregion
will face an increasing migration pressure.The observed globalization process
results in fast economic growth in many potential sending regions, especially
in Asia (for example China, India, Taiwan, Vietnam) and some countries in
Africa (for example,South Africa).Because of this economic growth and the
associated increase in living-standards, these countries may not only become
destination regions for international migrants.More importantly,the increas-
ing income associated with this process will enable many individuals residing
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19 See, for example, Bauer/Zimmermann (1997), Greenwood (1985), Massey et. al. (1993), and
Molho (1996) for surveys of different migration theories and the existing empirical evidence.
20 Fertig/Schmidt(2001)provideamoredetaileddiscussionaboutextrapolationoffuturemigra-
tion flows using aggregate-level studies of the determinants of migration.in these countries to finance their move to countries in the region. Even
though economic theories predict that the globalization process tends to re-
duce income differentials between countries in the long-run, it is unclear
whether income differentials between the region and third countries will in-
crease or decrease in the short- and medium-run. Hence, it may be possible
that globalization leads to increased migration pressure in the region. This
process may further be accelerated by falling information and transportation
costs.
At the same time,the demographic development in many countries of the re-
gion and the associated aging process of the population will result in an in-
creasingdemandforimmigrants.Giventheacceleratingprocessoftechnolog-
ical progress and the necessity to concentrate on the production of high-tech
products and knowledge in order to be able to compete with low-wage coun-
tries in Asia,Africa,Latin America and parts of Eastern Europe,much of this
increasing demand will concentrate on high-skilled labor. As already de-
scribed in section 2,an increasing competition among the countries in the re-
gion for high-skilled migrants could already be observed and it could be ex-
pected that this competition will further increase in the future. At the same
time,this development suggests that a coordinated development of migration
policies among the countries in the region will be hard to realize,at least as far
as skilled labor is concerned. Nevertheless, the increasing aging process in
most countries of the region will also increase the demand for personal ser-
vices (especially in the health sector),and hence the demand for low- and me-
dium-skilled labor.Given the low status of most of the employment opportu-
nities in the service sector for elderly,the relative paucity of young persons in
thenativepopulationwillingtoenterthissector,therewillbeafuturedemand
for especially young and middle age health service workers from outside the
region.
Finally,theglobalizationprocessandtheassociatedincreaseintheavailability
of information will most likely increase the portfolio of potential source coun-
tries of migrants for most countries in the region – a process that has already
been observed during the last few years. So far, migration flows occur mostly
along established migration networks (such as, those between Turkey and
Germany or between Mexico and the US). As information on the economic
and social situation in the potential destination regions spreads out, the rela-
tiveimportanceofthesetraditionalmigrationnetworkswilldecreaseandnew
migration networks will be established.
Thereareotherspecialdevelopmentsinsomecountrieswithintheregionthat
will potentially increase the inflow of persons into these countries. Most im-
portantly, even though the magnitude of the migration flows is very hard to
predict,theenlargementoftheEUtowardsCEEcountrieswillmostlikelyre-
International Labor Migration, Economic Growth and Labor Markets 43sult in increased East-West migration, but also in increasing migration flows
into and between the new members of the EU.21 Based on existing migration
networks it is rather likely that the most important destination countries for
the migrants will be Germany and Austria. Similarly, it is rather difficult to
forecast to what extent the increasing economic integration of Canada, Mex-
ico,andtheUSwithintheNAFTAagreementwillleadtoafurtherincreaseof
migration between these countries.
The development of future migration flows due to other than economic and
demographic reasons are even harder to predict,because of the uncertain de-
velopmentoftheexistingandthefutureoccurrenceofarmedconflictsandhu-
man rights violations.This holds also for environmental deterioration as main
migration factor, even though this factor seems to most likely contribute to
South-North migration flows.
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